only attend to so many issues at any given time and attention to one issue necessitates inattention to another issue. Presidents must choose between issues in the face of time and information constraints. These time constraints increase the importance of critical events, which force the President to attend to related issues at the cost of attention to other issues. Presidents are forced into a reactive mode when establishing their foreign policy agendas.
EXPANDING THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY
Wood and Peake (1998) and Edwards and Wood (1999) focus their analysis on highly salient, crisis-oriented issues. This focus, while providing important insights into the success of presidential agenda setting, may reduce practical generalizations we can make from their findings. Ripley and Franklin (1991) argue that foreign policy comes in many forms. It is likely that presidential influence will vary depending on the issue. Edwards and Wood (1999) clearly show this with their findings of increased presidential influence in domestic issues. A useful extension of this work would be to examine the President's agenda setting capabilities using a wider variety of issues and then compare to previous results. For this purpose, I focus my analysis on foreign policy issues not addressed by the two previous articles: Central America, the Caribbean, foreign aid and foreign trade. Central America and the Caribbean are arguably less important politically for the President,' and are certainly less critical to U.S. security than Soviet relations or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Aid and trade, on the other hand, while important politically, often involve structural issues that require the President to work closely with Congress (Lindsey 1994; Ripley and Franklin 1991).
Aid and trade are less tied to ongoing international events than other foreign policy issues. If events provide competition for the President and increase the power of the media in agenda setting, it is quite plausible that issues unrelated to exogenous events provide the President greater room to influence the agenda. One of the primary roles of the media is reporting on and interpreting international events for the American public (Graber 1997 ). Without exogenous international events determining the agenda, the role of the media may be relegated to reporting on conflict between the branches in Washington or covering the President. Therefore, I expect less influence by the media in foreign aid and trade, and greater influence by the President and Congress.
In foreign aid, Congress and the President share responsibility, with Congress jealously guarding its turf (Hinckley 1994) . Trade issues are also politically relevant to Congress, despite indications that Congress delegates trade authority to the executive (O'Halloran 1993). By focusing only on crisis-oriented issues that are usually addressed outside of the legislative process, previous research may underestimate the influence of Congress (Lindsay 1994) .
Issues examined here are less salient than issues studied previously2 High salience hinders the President's capacity to affect the agenda. If Congress and the media consistently attend to an issue (due to its high salience), it is less likely that activity by the President designed to increase the salience of an issue will have as noticeable an effect compared to an issue that is less salient. Moderate to low salience issues may provide the President opportunities to noticeably affect congressional or media attention. Lower salience decreases the competition Presidents receive from the media, possibly increasing the President's influence in relation to other agenda setters. Salience is also tied to the political importance of an issue. Increased political importance leads to high salience over time for an issue among the media, the people, and Congress, so the President is not without competition to influence the agenda. Congress and the media attend to highly salient issues regardless of the President's agenda.
Finally, issues such as the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict create difficult problems for the President, limiting the President's practical options. The Caribbean and Central America are less difficult to handle due to the relative ease with which U.S. Presidents can affect world events in our backyard. Due to the proximity and lack of military power of Central American and Caribbean nations, relative to the USSR and the nations involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is easier and less risky for a U.S. President to undertake high-profile actions in those areas, and thus affect the attention paid them by the media and Congress. The President's agenda setting capacity in relation to the media and Congress may be in part endogenous to the President's willingness and capacity to undertake the types of activities that tend to attract the attention of the media and Congress. We need only look to recent invasions of Grenada, Panama, and Haiti for confirmation.
lowing Gallup poll question: What is the most important problem facing the nation today? Another strategy is to use the amount of media attention related to an issue (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) . I compare the salience of the issues included here with the salience of issues in previous work using the average amount of TV news attention per week devoted to each issue. The averages are: Soviet Union-17 min/week, Arab-Israel-17 min/week, Bosnia-14 min/week, Central America-8 min/week, Caribbean-5 min/week, Trade-5 min/week, Aid-6 min/week. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press keeps track of the stories that are followed "very closely" by their poll respondents. Using 10 percent of the respondents following a related story "very closely" as a threshold, we can determine the relative salience of issues in terms of public attention. The number of news stories that qualify above the arbitrary threshold (from 1986 through 1995) are: Soviet Union-25 stories (total of 554 percent, when percentages are added), Arab-Israel-14 stories (377), Bosnia-18 stories (321), Central America-7 stories (188), Caribbean-6 stories (154), Trade-5 stories (114), Aid-0 stories. Source: http://www.people-press.org/database.htm.
In sum, the four issues examined below are less salient over time, less politically vital, and offer Presidents greater independence from international contexts that constrain their decision making (events and the viability of intervention) than previously studied issues. Due to these distinct differences, we might expect to find greater presidential influence in foreign policy agenda setting.
METHODS
The statistical approach I adopt takes into account both presidential influence and presidential responsiveness. Edwards and Wood (1999) . The models were estimated using WinRats, version 3.2. 5 In VAR, coefficient estimates are useless in determining the relationships between the variables in the system, thus VAR relies on Granger F-tests to determine causality. Moving average response (MAR) rates track out simulations of the system. MAR involves introducing a shock to a variable in the system and tracking out movements in the other variables using the VAR estimates for computing a forecast. Shocking a variable means increasing the independent series by one standard
The VAR model is essentially a series of regression equations where each endogenous variable in the system is set equal to lagged values of all of the other variables in the system. Since events in this particular analysis are a priori exogenous, the events variable is only included as an explanatory variable, with no lags (for the Caribbean and Central America issues).6 Institutional attention is modeled separately for each of the four issues. Table 1 shows the Granger Exogeneity F-tests for the determinants of institutional attention to the Caribbean, Central America, foreign aid, and trade. The results indicate that public presidential attention to all four of the issues Granger cause media attention. The F-tests for presidential attention causing media attention to the Caribbean, foreign aid, and trade are statistically significant at the .05 level. Presidential attention to Central America approaches standard levels of significance and is significant at the .1 level. Presidential attention has a significant impact on media attention even when controlling for competing international events, congressional attention, and previous media attention to the issues. The clearest finding of previous research was the inability of Presidents to affect media attention. Edwards and Wood (1999) found no systematic influence by Congress on the president's attention to U.S. Soviet relations or the Arab-Israeli conflict. In contrast, I find substantial congressional influence on the President. In three of the four issues (the Caribbean, Central America, and Foreign Aid), congressional attention Granger causes presidential attention. In each case, the Ftests are statistically significant at the .05 or .01 level. The moving average responses shown in Figures 1-4 suggest that the relationship may not be as robust at the F-tests indicate. However, when variable ordering is changed placing Congress first, the responsiveness of the President to Congress in these issues is born out.9 I find that presidential attention significantly impacts media attention when issues are less salient. I also find a reciprocal relationship between the President's public attention and attention by Congress. Presidents are responsive to media and congressional attention. However, the relationship is not one way While previous analysis was correct in stating that the President's agenda is often responsive, the results suggest that this responsiveness does not mean Presidents lack leadership capabilities in setting the foreign policy agenda. Apparently, the President's capacity to lead institutional attention depends on which foreign policy issues we look at.
RESULTS

Note: Media is weekly minutes of evening network television news coverage of Foreign Aid (from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive). President is the weekly number of paragraphs devoted to the Foreign Aid in the Public Papers of the President. Congress is the weekly number of columns devoted to the Foreign Aid in the Congressional
ANALYSIS BY PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
When are Presidents most likely to have success influencing the foreign policy agenda? When Presidents prioritize certain issues, they increase the chances of focusing and sustaining media and congressional attention. Edwards and Wood (1999: 340) suggest "that when the President makes a special effort to lead, he may succeed" at influencing the agenda. With greater freedom to establish the agenda in less salient or nonevent-driven issues, Presidents have greater opportunity to act on their policy priorities and sustain media and congressional attention. Therefore, we might expect that Presidents who clearly establish foreign policy priorities related to an issue have greater influence on media and congressional attention than have Presidents with unclear priorities .
In foreign aid and Central America, Reagan made aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and anti-communist governments in Central America a foreign policy priority (Reagan 1990 The results clearly indicate that President Clinton's public attention had a statistically significant impact on media and congressional attention to the Caribbean. Clinton's attention Granger caused both media and congressional attention to the Caribbean. Bush's attention had no effect on either the media or Congress, while Reagan had a significant influence on Congress, but not the media.
DISCUSSION
Edwards and Wood (1999: 32) conclude their study by stating, "Most of the time Presidents react, responding primarily to fluctuations in attention by the media and, in the area of foreign policy, world events... Nevertheless, we find evidence that the President can act in an entrepreneurial fashion to focus the attention of others in the system. If an issue is not already part of ongoing media coverage or congressional hearings, the President may be able to set the agenda of the networks and Congress." Expanding the analysis to include less salient and non-event driven foreign policy issues suggests that agenda setting relationships change across foreign policy issues and within a foreign policy issue across time.
I am able to show that the President substantially impacts media and congressional attention to foreign policy issues. What matters is the salience of the issue, whether the issue relates to events, and whether or not international realities constrain the President's options considerably Lower salience issues increase presidential opportunities to influence the agendas of other institutions. The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict are highly salient issues, whereas Central America, the Caribbean, foreign aid, and foreign trade are less salient. Presidential statements have no systematic effect on media or congressional attention to the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Edwards and Wood 1999), whereas the President significantly influences media attention to Central America, the Caribbean, aid, and trade, and congressional attention in Central America and the Caribbean. The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict offer limits on what the President can do to impact the agenda. Intervention or broad policy shifts are less viable, and the President is limited to diplomatic initiatives, which are less dramatic and attract less attention. Presidents are not as constrained in other issues.
Events limit the President's own agenda forcing the President to pay attention to issues he might prefer to ignore. In the issues where events were included, the President is highly responsive. The relationships between the President and the media and the President and Congress are reciprocal. In issues where events are not as relevant, the relationships are mixed. In aid, the relationship between the President and the media appears reciprocal, whereas, in trade the President influences the media but not vice versa. In relation to Congress, the relationship is weak from the President to Congress in both issues, whereas the President responds to Congress in foreign aid but not trade.
Analyzing by administration suggests that those Presidents that make a substantial effort to focus attention on the less salient issues are more successful. By spending the political capital necessary for influence, Presidents can indeed be successful agenda setters. Successful Presidents go well beyond speaking on an issue publicly. Along with the public relations strategy, they initiate legislation in Congress (as Reagan did with Contra aid and Bush with NAFTA), or even initiate military invasions abroad (as Bush and Clinton did). While focused speeches attract a lot of attention, Presidents are likely to be more successful extending congressional and media attention through legislative strategies and more dramatic presidential activities abroad. Recent challenges to the traditional model of agenda setting have expanded our understanding of the difficulties of presidential policymaking. Understanding that Presidents are often handicapped by the political and international context provides an explanation for why Presidents often become frustrated when trying to lead Congress and the American public in foreign policy. Nevertheless, I find evidence that the President can be successful in foreign policy agenda setting, focusing media and congressional attention by shifting his own agenda and prioritizing certain issues. The evidence suggests that success is not as common as the traditional model would have us believe. In order to be successful, Presidents must pick and choose their issues carefully, even in foreign policy. Presidents operate in a world of uncertainty, competing with other institutions for control of the policy agenda. Sometimes they are successful, other times they are not.
Many questions and concerns still exist for scholars to consider when examining the President's influence on the policy agenda. The data used in this analysis, as well as others, consist of crude counting measures, and the research program would benefit greatly from expanded data collection and disaggregation. For instance, many of the media sources are official (including the White House), yet counts of media stories and amount of coverage typically attribute the measure as the independent media agenda. This is a common problem when using media based measures, as noted recently by Woolley (2000) . Future study should take into account media sources so attribution of causation can be more clearly assigned. It is also worth noting that a broad aggregate study, such as this one, misses many of the nuances of agenda setting involved in the various issues. More focused case studies on the topic would be a worthwhile contribution to the research program.
